Радослав Сыкорский. Фото: Jaap Arriens / Sipa USA / ТАСС.
“Systematic Attack on the Western World”
“We can no longer claim that Russia is only engaging in disinformation against us. Russia is conducting a full-scale cognitive war against us.” When Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski uttered these words on June 8 at the conference “War for Minds: Fear, Sabotage, Disinformation” held in the Sejm, he summed up the political outcome of several months of warnings from Polish intelligence services. Recently, arson, sabotage, espionage, sabotage on the railways, and political radicalization were viewed as separate phenomena. Today, Warsaw perceives them as elements of a unified campaign to pressure the West. According to Sikorski, the Kremlin is allegedly not only acting against Ukraine or individual states. It is a systematic attack on the entire Western world, its institutions, alliances, and ability to resist. “Moscow is conducting this operation through guerrilla methods, hiring groups and individuals operating under multi-layered cover in a space that is operationally difficult to access, which we still do not consider a classical theater of military operations,” he added.
Russia’s cognitive struggle with Poland has a concrete history, as evidenced by a chain of events in the past two years. One of the main directions of this campaign, according to Warsaw’s assessment, is the attempts to sow discord between Poles and Ukrainians – two societies whose proximity since February 2022 has become one of the Kremlin’s most significant political defeats in the region. Polish intelligence services and the government have repeatedly accused Russia of attempting to stoke mutual distrust through social media, anonymous accounts, and information campaigns. Special attention was given to narratives related to historical memory, especially with the Volyn Tragedy. In addition, Russian media actively spread the thesis that modern Poland is allegedly planning to annex Western Ukraine, aiming to revive historical grievances and disrupt the current strategic alliance between Warsaw and Kyiv.
Gzhegozh Braun. Photo: Zuma \ TASS.
A striking example became the catastrophic floods of autumn 2024. In the midst of the crisis, messages began to spread massively on the Polish social media segment about victims supposedly concealed by the authorities, significantly inflated casualty figures, and deliberate deception of the population. The government directly declared the activities of accounts linked to Russia, whose goal was not to inform but to create panic and undermine trust in state institutions. Polish authorities also associate the activities of pro-Russian political and social networks with this. Gzhegozh Braun, the leader of the far-right party “Confederation of the Polish Crown,” openly advocates for “normalization” of relations with Moscow. According to polls, the party is gaining popularity, and today 8% of the population could vote for them, guaranteeing a confident passage to the Sejm. One of the potential candidates of the “Confederation” in the future parliamentary elections is currently on trial on charges of espionage for Russia.
Pressure Instruments
In recent months, the Polish prosecutor’s office has also brought charges against several Polish citizens, who, according to the investigation, not only spread pro-Russian disinformation but also collected information on NATO troop movements, underwent firearms training, and allegedly prepared for sabotage actions. Looking at these episodes together, it becomes clearer what Sikorski had in mind. Arson, disinformation, incitement of interethnic enmity, espionage, surveillance of NATO objects, and preparation of potential diversions in Polish logic no longer exist separately from each other. These are different instruments of the same pressure campaign. The Polish minister referred to Russia’s propaganda budget: around $1.4 billion in 2025 alone and over $6 billion since the full-scale operations in Ukraine began. In comparison, he noted, the EU spends “several tens, at most a few hundred million euros” to combat disinformation at the bloc level. “Let’s not harbor illusions: our information ecosystem is besieged, and we are not yet sufficiently prepared to counter the threats,” said Sikorski.
According to Polish politicians, Russia’s goal is to weaken the resistance by causing division and undermining democratic values. “We also have a Russian fifth column in Poland. This is confirmed by the numbers,” said Sikorski. The minister did not specify which exact figures he was referring to, but in the Polish political context, statistical data indicating a particular social phenomenon are usually referenced. Such a formulation itself would have been unthinkable for the official rhetoric of a state – a member of the European Union a few years ago. Another important point made by the minister was: “Fighting this phenomenon is extremely difficult. We cannot, do not want, and will not limit freedom of speech. But freedom of speech does not mean freedom from responsibility… Let us follow a simple principle: what is prohibited in the real world should be prohibited in the virtual world.” Thus, Warsaw sees the problem not only in Moscow’s actions but also in its own vulnerability – in how democratic societies can become targets of manipulation, while remaining true to their principles.
Telegraph Saboteurs
A few weeks earlier, the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) published a report explaining the harsh language of the authorities. The main conclusion of counterintelligence sounded uncompromising: Russia replaces haphazard recruitment of random operatives through Telegram with the creation of a stable pressure infrastructure inside Europe. “We are witnessing a shift from cheap agents to professional sabotage structures,” said ABW’s head Rafal Syrysko. According to him, the new network allegedly relies on organized crime, cross-border logistical chains, and individuals with experience in law enforcement agencies. If initially, low-cost individuals were hired through cryptocurrency – migrants and debtors were supposedly tasked with graffiti, photographing military columns, and installing cameras at railway junctions – now there could allegedly be power actions. The previous model was convenient for the client: the executor was cheap, replaceable, and knew almost nothing, while the organizer was far beyond the European Union.
Donald Tusk (on the right) after the meeting. Photo: AP / TASS.
The figures provided by ABW look almost sensational. Only in 2025, Polish counterintelligence opened 48 investigations suspected of espionage – more than twice as many as the previous year. In 2024-2025, there were 69 such investigations – as many as in the period from 1991 to 2023, that is, in 32 years, with charges brought against 82 individuals. For Warsaw, this is evidence that the Polish state is facing a qualitatively new (in)security environment. These figures largely explain why the leaders of Polish intelligence agencies have begun to speak in such harsh terms. When, in two years, counterintelligence faces the same number of cases as in the previous 32 years, it inevitably concludes that not only has the intensity of its own work changed. The nature of the threat has changed. Essentially, this is the threshold where both Syrysko and Sikorski are talking about. For Polish authorities, it is no longer about a series of unrelated episodes; in recent years, intelligence services have been evaluating the overall picture: the same methods, intersecting networks, similar recruitment channels, intertwining misinformation, sabotage, espionage, and criminal intermediation. This has prompted official Warsaw to conclude that it is facing a new model of pressure on the state and society. To understand how it all began, one must go back to the night of May 2024, when Marywilska 44 – a huge shopping complex of 1400 pavilions in the Bialolenka district – burned down. Every Pole knew this place, not only in the capital. If we were to seek a Russian analogy, Marywilska was something like a civilized Warsaw analogue to “Cherkizon” – without its criminal reputation, but with the same sense of vast trading space. After the fire, this world practically disappeared.
Marywilska 44 shopping complex after the fire. Photo: AP / TASS.
A year later, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that the arson was allegedly orchestrated by Russian intelligence services, which sounded like confirmation of long-growing concerns. It was not a NATO warehouse or an arms factory that was destroyed, but a significant place in the daily life of a large city. The blow was dealt to the sense of security of civilians and their usual routes. The Polish prosecutor’s office claims that the perpetrators acted within a broader structure that encompassed several countries in the region. Among the accused at the lower levels are citizens of Ukraine and one Belarusian. The investigation materials mention Daniil B. (who was supposed not only to participate in the operation but also to document its consequences for the curators) and Alexander Kh. Both defendants are also involved in episodes related to the attack on the IKEA store in Vilnius and the preparation of new operations. By the autumn of 2025, Polish courts had already handed down the first verdicts to members of this network.
Corridor under Attack?
After February 2022, Poland became not only a political opponent of the Kremlin but also the main rear corridor of Ukraine. Through Polish territory, military cargo, equipment, ammunition, and humanitarian aid pass. Thus, Polish rails have become the arteries of the armed conflict running through the territory of a state that is not formally involved in it. During this time, Warsaw sharply increased defense spending, re-armed the army, strengthened the eastern flank of NATO, and built a robust political identity. In the Polish understanding, what is called Russophobia in Moscow has long been perceived as immunity, where historical memory works as an early warning system. Therefore, Warsaw speaks tougher than many other European capitals. Donald Tusk calls what is happening a part of the Russian hybrid war. Defense Minister Vladislav Kosinyak-Kamish states the need to protect the defense industry and internal state systems. Authorities are reducing Moscow’s diplomatic presence in Poland. Over the past year and a half, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has completely eliminated Russia’s consular network, shutting down all three consulates general in succession. The official reason given was the alleged involvement of Russian intelligence services in organizing sabotage and subversion on the country’s territory.
Photo: Zuma \ TASS.
The Consulate General in Poznan (November 2024) was liquidated after the arrest of a man planning to set fire to a paint factory in Wroclaw. The Consulate General in Krakow (May 2025) was closed after authorities accused Russia of organizing a massive arson attack on the Marywilska 44 shopping center in Warsaw. The Consulate General in Gdansk (November 2025) was the last mission closed by Radoslaw Sikorski after incidents of sabotage and damage to the railway tracks on the Warsaw-Lublin line. Moscow has consistently rejected all accusations from the Polish side. There are no more independent consulates general of Russia left in Poland – the Gdansk mission was the last. However, this does not mean a complete cessation of consular assistance or a rupture of diplomatic relations. The Russian Embassy in Warsaw is still operating, with a regular consular department in function. Basic services for citizens are still being provided, but exclusively in the capital.
Spies in the Defense Sector
The most disturbing turn is that Polish intelligence services are increasingly encountering cases where the individuals involved are inside sensitive state and defense structures. In February 2026, Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service detained a 60-year-old civilian employee of the Department of Defense Strategic Information and Planning who had worked there for over 30 years. According to the investigation, the official collaborated with Russian and Belarusian intelligence, having access to confidential information on army modernization, defense planning, and NATO cooperation. The court arrested him on espionage charges, and he now faces a sentence of up to life imprisonment. Also in February, a Belarusian citizen was arrested for espionage against military facilities in Poland, Germany, and Lithuania. In May 2026, a Polish citizen working at one of the key enterprises of the state defense concern PGZ was arrested. Jointly, the Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW) and the Internal Security Agency (ABW) have gathered evidence indicating the collection and transmission of data by the figure that could harm the republic, for which he now faces imprisonment ranging from eight years to life. As part of a large-scale operation by Polish security forces to eradicate Russian and Belarusian agent networks, three more Polish citizens were arrested in May 2026. According to Warsaw’s estimates, Europe is facing the formation of an infrastructure of permanent covert aggression – from social networks to defense enterprises. However, in his speech in the Sejm, Radoslaw Sikorski rejected the notion that the West is losing to Moscow: “We are not the weak side in this confrontation. We have just been more polite until now.” Here, it is believed that Poland identified the new nature of the threat before many allies and is now trying to convey it to the whole of Europe. Vasily Vermensky, specially for “Nova”.